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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THOMAS MAUGHAN, * 
Plaintiff/Appellant, » BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
vs. 
* 
PAULETTE LADAWN NORMAN MAUGHAN Case No. 870589-CA 
Defendant/Respondent. Priority No. 7 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Plaintiff/Appel 3 ant, Thomas G. Maughan, has appealed an 
Order of the First Judicial District Court of Cache County, the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, which was entered on or about 
November 23, 1987. Plaintiff timely filed a Notice of Appeal on 
or about December 21, 1987, pursuant to Section 78-2-3(2)(g) 
Utah Code Annotated. 
MATURE OF PROCEEDING^ 
The parties were divorced by Decree of the First District 
Court of Cache County, the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, on or 
about February 7, 1983. Defendant was granted custody of an' 
unborn chi J d of t he parties^ subject t o reasonable visitation. 
That child, Riley Maughan, was born on July 23, 1983. 
On or about July 14, 1987, Plaintiff filed a Petition to 
Modify the Decree requesting custody of Riley. Defendant filed 
an Answer and Counterpetition on or about August 3, 1987 
requesting, among other things, an increase in child support and 
attorney's fees. 
A two day hearing was held October 16, 1987, and again on 
November 5, 1987, whereafter the Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision in favor of Defendant on or about November 9, 1987, 
denying Plaintiff's Petition for Modification on the grounds 
that there had been no substantial or material change in 
circumstances of the custodial parent's parenting ability or the 
functioning of the custodial relationship which would justify 
reopening the custody questions, increasing child support to 
$150*00 per month and granting attorney's fees in the amount of 
$3,000.00* The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the 
Judgment and Order were entered on the Petition and 
Counterpetition on or about November 23, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
It is Defendant's position that there are three central 
issues to be presented on appeal, which are: 
1. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
finding that there had not been a substantial nor material 
change in circumstances relating to Defendant's parenting 
ability or the functioning of the custodial relationship which 
would justify reopening the custody question. 
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2. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
awarding attorney's fees to Defendant* 
3* Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
increasing child support. 
Since the Trial Court determined that there had not been a 
material change in circumstances to justify reopening the 
custody question, the Trial Court did not and could not (nor 
should this Court) consider the custody issue and if the best 
interests of the child would be servBd by a change in custody* 
Therefore, any determination of the best interests of the child, 
while the child's best interests may always be a paromount 
factor, are not an issue to be presented to this Court on 
appeal. 
In addition, Defendant requests this Court to determine if 
Plaintiff's appeal is meritorious or frivolous, and if attorneys 
fees and double costs should be awarded to Defendant pursuant to 
Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, for being 
required to respond to this Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent basically concurs in Appellant's Statement of 
the Case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent concurs with Appellant's Statement of Facts, 
except as follows, and with additional facts as stated herein: 
1. Defendant's moves were occassioned by her attempts to 
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receive vocational training in order to obtain employment and/or 
to improve employment* The majority of the moves were temporary 
in nature while relocating because of vocational training or 
employment. (TR pp. 9-13) . 
2. Defendant has always resided in either Cache County, 
Box Elder County, Davis County, or Salt Lake County, all 
relatively close to Plaintiff's residence. (TR pp. 9-13) 
3. Defendant acknowledged going to bars on various 
weekends with a friend, but at no time acknowledged "bar 
hopping" as referred to by Plaintiff's counsel. "Bar hopping" 
is an acronym composed by Plaintiff's counsel and in no way 
correctly depicts Defendant's social activities or the propriety 
of her activities with her friends. <TR pp. 30-31) 
4. Defendant acknowledged relationships with various 
men, but indicated that only one* of the men stayed with her in 
the Kearns apartment rented from Bill Peck. On the substantial 
majority of occasions Defendant would have a boyfriend stay with 
her, the children were not at home and were visiting with their 
fathers on weekend visitation. <TR pp. 58, 368) 
5. At no time did Defendant expose herself improperly to 
her children or engage in sexual acts or conduct in front of the 
children. (TR p. 368) 
6. Although there was substantial evidence presented 
regarding alleged abuse of Riley by Defendant's boyfriend. Jack 
Alley, the Trial Court made no finding as to the truth of those 
allegations, but did specifically find that Defendant was not 
aware of any alleged abuse and that Defendant immediately took 
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what steps she could to ensure the child's safety and welfare 
and immediately consulted professionals for aid when the 
allegations became known to her. (MD pp. 3, 5 TAB i) 
7. Judge Christoffersen found that there was conflicting 
testimony regarding Defendant's housekeeping abilities and 
parenting skills, but specifically found that Defendant properly 
maintained the home and took care of the child and that 
Defendant's care for Riley and her parenting skills were not 
inappropriate, further finding that Riley was clean and well 
cared for and that Defendant showed great affection for Riley. 
(MD p. 4 TAB 1; FF #1 TAB 2) 
8* The District Court did not accept testimony regarding 
allegations of excrement being smeared on the walls, the alleged 
cleanliness of Defendant's apartment, or condition of her 
laundry, and any statements by Plaintiff in Plaintiff's Brief to 
the effect are allegations not accepted by the Court bs fact. 
There is no mention of those allegations in the Court's 
Memorandum Decision nor in the Findings of Fact, and, therefore, 
those allegations cannot be stated as fact. 
9. Defendant explained that the medical treatment she 
had received for a suspected miscarriage is technically termed a 
"clinical abortion" for medical purposes and denied ever 
aborting an unborn fetus. The "clinical abortion" related only 
to the common medical treatment as a result of her miscarriage. 
<TR p. 51) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The Trial Court is afforded considerable 
discretion which can only be overcome by a showing that the 
evidence clearly ptreponderates to the contrary or that the Trial 
Court, clearly abused its discretion or misapplied the law, which 
does not. exist, in the instant action* 
A. The Trial Court is in the best position to 
weigh "the evidence and consider the credibility and reliability 
of the witnesses. The Trial Court weighed and considered the 
evidence, including Defendant's residential moves and job 
changes, alleged lack of supervision and care of her children, 
alleged sexual conduct and other matters, and determined that 
there had not been a substantial change in Defendant's parenting 
ability or the custodial relationship in order to warrant 
reopening the custody question. 
B. The Supreme Court of Utah has set forth 
clear and sp&c±±±a guidelines for the trial courts to follow in 
modification actions. 
C. Conflicting testimony by neighbors and 
acquaintefjces as well as expert witnesses was adequately 
considered by the Court. 
D. The best interests of the children in any 
divorce or post-divorce custody action is always of paramount 
importance. However, in a modification action, the moving party 
must first overcome the threshold showing of a substantial 
change in circumstances related to the custodial parent's 
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parenting ability and the functioning of the custodial 
relationship. As determined by the Trial Court in the instant 
action, Plaintiff did not meet that substantial burden. 
E. Even had the Trial Court considered nbest 
interests" factor, the testimony of the family therapist, Dr. B. 
Mathews Hill, Ed. D., inidicated that Respondent was a good 
parent and at no time stated that the best interests of the 
minor child would be served by changing custody. 
II. The Trial Court has considerable discretion in 
awarding attorney's fees and considered the reasonableness of 
the hourly rate as to the community standard, the necessity of 
the number of hours, Defendant's need, the financial condition 
of the parties and all other factors in determining attorney's 
fees. 
A. Evidence and testimony proffered by 
Defendant's counsel and the Findings of Fact entered by the 
Court clearly meet the requirements necessary for the Court to 
award attorney's fees. 
Ill* The Trial Court is granted considerable discretion in 
establishing child support. 
A. Appellant's new job with the State Highway 
Department in addition to his farming income was considered by 
the Court as a substantial and material change of circumstances. 
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B* The Uniform Child Support Guidelines are to 
be followed in temporary child support orders and even then can 
be modified by the Court* However, the Court's award of child 
support still falls within the Uniform Child Support Guidelines* 
IV* In light of the clear outcome of the case* there is 
no reasonable basis for Plaintiff's appeal and Defendant should 
be awarded attorneys fees and double costs* 
ARGUMENTS 
THE TRIAL COURT IS AFFORDED CONSIDERABLE 
DISCRETION* WHICH CAN ONLY BE OVERCOME BY A 
SHOWING THAT THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY PREPONDERATES TO 
THE CONTRARY OR THAT THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION OR MISAPPLIED THE LAW* WHICH 
DOES NOT EXIST IN THE INSTANT ACTION* 
A» The Trial Court i^ j clearly in the best position to 
weigh the evidence, determine credibility and arrive at factual 
conclusions* 
It is a long-established principle of appellate review that 
the trial court is granted considerable d&±±^T&ncB in its 
decisions which can only be overcome by a clear showing that the 
trial court abused its discretion in entering its decision* The 
reason is obvious* It is the trial court which is in the 
position to hear the testimony and consider the credibility of 
the witnesses* not only from their statements, but from their 
appearance* candor and demeanor* The trial court 
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is in the best position to determine and weigh factors which 
cannot be incorporated into the transcript which is read by the 
appellate court. This is especially true in divorce actions 
which are equitable in nature and in which the court is given 
wide discretion in entering its decisions. 
This principle was most recently reiterated by this Court 
in PORCO v. PQRCO, 79 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
wherein Judge Garff stated: 
To overturn Ea finding of the trial court], 
Plaintiff must show that the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary, or that the trial 
court abused its discretion or misapplied the law, 
or that the trial court's award works such a 
manifest in Justice as to show clearly an abuse in 
discretion. GILL v. GILL, 718 P.2d 779, 780 
(Utah 1986). However, the trial court is 
afforded considerable discretion, and its actions 
are cloaked with a presumption of validity. Id. ; 
see also KING v. KING, 717 P.2d 715, 715-16 (Utah 
1986); BOYLE v. BOYLE, 735 P.2d 669, 670 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 79 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. 
In a case similar to the instant action, the Utah 
Supreme Court has clearly stated the purpose and paramaters 
o± appellate review and the factors to be considered by the 
appellate. In SHIOJI v. SHIOJI, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah, 1985), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In divorce proceedings, including custody matters, 
the trial court is afforded particularly broad 
discretion. Only where the trial court's judgment 
is so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of 
discretion will this Court interpose its own 
judgment. The issue on appeal is not whether the 
trial court's findings accord with our own view of 
the evidence, but whether, viewing the evidence 
and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the 
9 
light most favorable to the findings, the findings 
are supported by the evidence* The trial court's 
proximity to the witnesses and its opportunity to 
hear their testimony and observe their demeanor, 
places it in a far more advantaged position than 
this Court, which must rely on an inanimate 
record. 712 P.2d at 210. 
The Utah Supreme Court further stated in FONTENOT v. 
FONTENOT, 714 P.2d 1131 (Utah, 1986): 
We do not disturb the trial court's decision 
absent a showing of an abuse of discretion or 
manifest injustice- In these matters we will not 
interpose our own judgment in place of the trial 
court's broad exercise of discretion unless it is 
shown to be so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse 
of discretion* The issue on appeal is not whether 
the trial court's exercise of its discretion 
BCGOTds with our own view of the evidence, but 
whether its findings are supported by substantial 
evidence. 714 P.2d at 1132, 1133. 
The trial court's discretionary authority should be 
even more strictly preserved in dealing with requests for 
modification of earlier custody awards, as in this action. 
In that regard. Justice Zimmerman stated in his concurring 
opinion in SMITH v. SMITH, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986): 
I find nothing objectionable in the majority's 
statement that we give wide deference to trial 
court decisions in the custody area, at least when 
we are reviewing rulings, such as the instant one, 
that involve initial placements. And I stronly 
support that portion of the opinion that requires 
written findings of fact and conclusions of law 
explaining how the factors relavent to a 
determination of the best interests of the child 
bear upon the ultimate resolution reached by the 
trial court. However, I disagree with any 
implication in the majority opinion that decisions 
regarding the modification of earlier custody 
awards also are entitled to such broad 
d&±±er&nc&. In my view, that is 
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not the law, and it is not sound policy. See 
SHIOJI v. SHIOJI, 712 P.2d 197, 202 (Utah, 1985) 
(Zimmerman, J. dissenting): See also MOODY v. 
MOODY, 715 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, 
J., concuring in result) (very high standard for 
reopening custodial orders); HIRSCH v. HIRSCH, 725 
P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J. , 
concuring separately) (custody changes governed by 
strict standards, different from those applicable 
in initial custody awards). To state the 
applicable standard carelessly is to invite 
confusion in an area in which courts have 
exceptional powers over the lives of children of 
divorced parents, an area where the erradication 
of such confusion should be an important goal. 
HIRSCH v. HIRSCH, 725 P.2d at 1322 (Zimmerman, J., 
concuring separately). 726 P.2d at 426, 427. 
B. The Supreme Court of Utah has set forth clear and 
specific guidelines for the trial courts to follow in 
modification actions. 
The development in Utah law regarding the requirements 
which must be met to modify a custody dBCTB^ is detailed in 
the Utah Supreme Court decison of KRAMER v. KRAMER, 738 P. 2d 
624 (Utah 1987)- Therein, Justice Zimmerman, in writing the 
majority opinion, outlines the development of the law from 
HOGGE v- HOGGE, 649 P, 2d 51 (Utah 1982), in which 
Plaintiff's counsel in the instant action, Mr. Healy, was 
counsel for Defendant/Respondent in the HOGGE case, to the 
most recent decisions regarding custody modification action* 
In KRAMER, the trial court ruled that there had not 
been a sufficient change in circumstances to reconsider the 
earlier custody award* The father, the non-custodial 
parent, claimed that he had remarried, that he, his new 
wife, and her two children by a previous marriage had formed 
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a good relationship with the child and that he had obtained 
advanced degrees in phsychology and had good employment. 
The father claimed that his ex-wife's new husband beat her, 
that she was an alcoholic, that she suffered from a 
narcistic personality, that she created animosity between 
the child and his father, that she refused to obtain 
treatment for the child's alleged speech defects and that 
the child was unwashed and unkempt when the father came to 
the home for visitation. The opinion stated that the 
mother's evidence contradicted the father's in nearly every 
respect. 
In reviewing the standards which must be followed in 
custody modification cases. Justice Zimmerman stated: 
A central premise of our recent child custody 
cases is the view that stable custody arrangements 
are of critical importance to the child's proper 
development. See e.g., FONTENOT v. FONTENOT, 714 
P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1986); SHIOJI v. SHIOJI, 
712 P. 2d 197, 203 (Utah 1985)(Zimmerman, J. , 
dissenting); BECKER v. BECKER, 694 P.2d 608, 610 
(Utah 1984); HOGGE v. HOGGE, 649 P.2d 51, 55 (Utah 
1982); B. HAFEN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF 
MARRIAGE, KINSHIP, AND SEXUAL PRIVACY - BALANCING 
THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL INTERESTS, 81 Mich. L. 
Rev. 463, 473-74 (1983-) The two-part HOGGE test 
is founded upon that premise, HOGGE v. HOGGE, 649 
P. 2d at 54. No matter how well intentioned, 
changes in custody can do more harm than good. 
See HAFEN, Supra, at 474. For this reason, when a 
trial court has been asked to determine whether 
there has been a change of circumstances 
sufficient to warrant reopening the custody 
decree, ordinarily it must focus exclusively on 
the parenting ability of the custodial parent and 
the functioning of the established custodial 
relationship. 738 P. 2d at 626. 
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Justice Zimmerman further indicated: 
The "change of circustances" threshold is high to 
discourage frequent petitions for modification of 
custody decrees. The test was designed to 
"protect the custodial parent from harrassment by 
repeated litigation" and to protect the child from 
"ping-pong custody wars". See HOGGE, 649 P. 2d at 
53-54. 738 P.2d at 626. 
The trial court in the instant action carefully 
followed the KRAMER decision in not only reaching its own 
decision, but in allowing certain testimony. During the 
trial, the Court quoted from KRAMER when Plaintiff was 
attempting to introduce evidence regarding his change in 
circumstances and parenting abilities. The Trial Court 
stated: 
I'll just quote from one of them and that is 
KRAMER versus KRAMER, where on appeal on the same 
circumstances the father was seeking [a 3 custodial 
change claiming the trial court erred in refusing 
to consider change in the noncustodial parent's 
situations when determining there had been a 
sufficient change of circumstances. The court 
goes on to say we disagree. You only focus on the 
change of circumstances of the custodial parent. 
<TR p. 204) 
C» Conflicting testimony by neighbors and 
acquaintances as well as expert witnesses was adequately 
considered by the Court. 
The modification hearing in the case at bar lasted two 
days. A total of eighteen witnesses were called and gave 
testimony. In the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision (TAB 1) 
Judge Christoffersen reviewed the testimony of each of the 
witnesses, those called by the Plaintiff and by the 
Defendant, as well as the parties themselves, and stated 
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that the testimony offered by Plaintiff's witnesses had been 
contradicted by the Defedant as well as witnesses called in 
her behalf. <MD p. 2, TAB 1) The Trial Court stated in that 
regard: 
The Court feels that the evidence does not support 
the Defendant being a bad mother by improper child 
care, cleanliness, supervision, or lack thereof, 
that she is a good mother with appropriate child 
caring skills now as when she was married. <MD p. 
4 TAB 1) 
As an indication of the contrasting evidence and 
testimony upon which the Trial Court based its decision, 
which Plaintiff claims is an abuse of discretion, Defendant 
would like to herein briefly respond to the claims raised in 
Appellant's Brief, and relate contrasting testimony: 
ALLEGATIONS OF FREQUENT MOVES. Plaintiff claims that 
Defendant's various residential moves were detrimental to 
the child and points out to this Court that Defendant moved 
twelve times in four years. What Plaintiff does not point 
out is that most of the moves were to allow Defendant as a 
young, single, mother to improve her job training and 30b 
skills and to obtain adequate employment. 
Shortly after the divorce, Plaintiff resided with her 
mother for one month in Wellsville where the parties had 
lived while married, until Defendant could arrange for an 
apartment in Logan. After approximately one year, Defendant 
moved to Clearfield to obtain employment. She stayed there 
for approximately eight months and then moved to Brigham 
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City to obtain additional vocational education and to 
complete a secretarial course* She first stayed with an 
aunt in Brigham City for approximately one month until she 
could find an apartment on her own. After she completed her 
secretarial course, Defendant moved to Salt Lake to obtain 
employment. Defendant lived in two different apartments in 
Salt Lake with the second move in Salt Lake being an attempt 
to find less costly housing* From Salt Lake* Defendant 
returned to Logan where her mother and other extended family 
live and to obtain employment* Defendant lived in three 
different apartments in Logan* each an attempt to improve 
her situation* (TR pp. 11-13) Clearly those were all 
factors considered by the Court in reaching its decision* 
STABILITY* Plaintiff further claims that the family 
therapist, Dr* Hill, indicated the moves were detrimental to 
Riley* However, in referring to stability of environment, 
Dr. Hill re±BT-s to the extensive visitation exercised by 
Plaintiff and the need for visitation to stabilize* (Dr* 
Hill p. 6 TAB 4) Defendant had stated that she had always 
attempted to encourage as much visitation and contact 
between Riley and his father and stepmother as possible, 
even to the extent of having Riley stay with his father for 
two and three weeks in his home and then back in her home 
for two or three weeks* Defendant was of the impression 
that extended visitation was beneficial and always worked to 
encourage a strong relationship. <TR pp* 55 and 56.) 
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Defendant then learned and was advised that the extensive 
visitation schedule was more unstabling than beneficial and 
was futher advised that visitation should be every other 
weekend (TR pg. 56,) which is supported by Dr. Hill. 
SUPERVISION OF CHILDREN- As reviewed by the Court in 
its Memorandum Decision, Plaintiff called several witnesses 
to testify of Defendant's lack of supervision of the 
children, including allowing the children to break open a 
screen and crawl out through a basement window and other 
isolated incidents. The Court noted that Defendant's 
witnesses had indicated proper supervision and control of 
the children. <MD pp. 1-4, TAB 1) The Court may have also 
considered that young boys ages 5 and 7 sometimes get into 
trouble in spite of the most stringent supervision. 
ALLEGED SEXUAL CONDUCT. Plaintiff alleges that 
Defendant's sexual activity was improper and adversly 
impacted the child. The Supreme Court of Utah has indicated 
that "the custodial parent's extramarital sexual 
relationship alone is insufficient to justify change of 
custody.* FONTENOT v. FONTENOT, 714 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1986). 
In FONTENOT, after separation from her husband, the 
plaintiff engaged in separate overnight relationships with 
various men in her home. At the time of the initial trial, 
she had recently given birth to a third child resulting from 
one of the affairs. The court indicated that although the 
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children were personally acquainted with these male 
companions, the plaintiff had testified that she was 
discrete in her intimate relationships. The court further 
noted that there was no evidence that the children had been 
directly exposed to or affected by the mother's sexual 
behavior and the trial court had made no finding that the 
children were adversely impacted by these relationships, and 
that the defendant had not presented) any evidence which 
would support such a finding* 
In the instant action, the Plaintiff testified that she 
seldom had boyfriends stay with her overnight while the 
children were there, since each of her children were 
visiting with their father on alternate weekend visitation* 
(TR p. 368) Defendant further testified that although Riley 
had seen her and her boyfriend, Jack Alley, in bed at 
approximately 2:00 a.m. on one occassion, at no time did she 
or her boyfriend ever expose themselves to the children or 
at any other time. (TR pp. 52-53) The Court specifically 
found that Plaintiff's sexual relations had not impacted or 
affected the child. <F.F. p.2 TAB 2; MD p.6 TAB 1) 
Judge Christoffersen considered all of this in 
information and more in entering his decision and clearly 
considered all of the testimony before him. As indicated, 
there is more than sufficient evidence to support the 
decision. 
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D. Considerations of the best interests of the child 
in custody modification requests. 
The Trial Court referred to both the HOGGE and KRAMER 
decisions in his Memorandum Decision, (MD p. 5 TAB 1) and 
based his decision in the instant action on a clear 
understanding of the standards set forth in KRAMER and its 
progeny. The Trial Court/ after having had the opportunity 
to listen to the Defendant and to determine what kind of 
person she is, recognized that although there were facts and 
circumstances about the Defendant's living condition and 
lifestyle that may not be the best for the child, it could 
not be said that her actions and conduct in the situation 
constituted a substantial change in circumstances. The 
Trial Court stated: 
The conduct, whatever it may be of the Defendant, 
must be shown to have a substantial adverse impact 
upon the child, showing a material change of 
circumstances* That impact has not been shown 
even if her conduct has had defects and she bore 
an illigitimate child* Petitioner's request to 
have the custody changed is denied* (MD p. 6 TAB 1) 
The Trial Court further indicated that the changes that 
normally occur in a divorce are not grounds to show a 
substantial change in circustances that would merit or 
should even be considered in determining the requisite 
substantial change in circumstances for a change in 
custody. The Court also stated that divorce causes a change 
in circumstances by the very nature of the result of such a 
proceeding. (MD pp. 3 and 4 TAB 1). In that regard, Judge 
Christoffersen stated: 
A single parent who has to take what employment 
they can get certainly has more difficulty as 
opposed to dual parents. The single parent has to 
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arrange schedules, child care, perform all the 
household tasks, that are necessary. The Court 
does not feel that the Defendant should be 
penalized because of this kind of situation where 
she does not have the same financial abilities as 
the Petitioner in order to provide a stable 
environment. The fact that the Petitioner has 
remarried making this a dual parent household is 
not such a substantial change of circumstances 
that would merit a change of custody or simply any 
remarriage would have the ping-pong effect on 
child custody. 
The Court, therefore, feels the Petitioner 
has not met the first prong of the test as stated 
under HOGG v. HOGG [sic3, 649 P.2d 51. The Court 
feels the facts do not show Defendant's present 
position substantially affects the custodial 
parenting ability or the functioning of the 
custodial relationship, which would justify 
reopening the custody question. < 31D p. 5 TAB 1) 
E» The family therapist also concluded that 
Defendant is a good parent 
Furthermore, although Plaintiff claims that the family 
therapist. Dr. Hill, suggested that custody would be best 
placed with Plaintiff, even Plaintiff notes that Dr. Hill 
only indicated that Plaintiff's home represented the "more 
stable environment.* At no time did Dr. Hill indicate a 
preference as to custody or who should have custody. In 
fact, in the conclusion of his report, Dr. Hill focuses on 
the stability of the environment and states: "Looking after 
the best interests of the child does not always involve 
deciding between good and bad, but may also look at good 
versus better." (Hill p. 8 TAB 4) Dr. Hill further 
testified at the hearing that Defendant was a good parent. 
<TR pp. 137, 142) 
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The fact remains, based on all the evidence of the 
parties, the Court concluded that Defendant was " a good 
mother with appropriate child caring skills now as when she 
was married.B <MD p. 4 TAB 1) 
Certainly, there is more than sufficient evidence to 
support the Trial Court's decision that there had not been a 
substantial change in circumstances to warrant reopening the 
custody matter. The Court's decision should, therefore, be 
affirmed. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES. IN THE INSTANT ACTION, 
THE COURT CONSIDERED THE REASONABLENESS OF THE 
HOURLY RATE AS COMPARED TO THE COMMUNITY STANDARD, 
THE NECESSITY OF THE NUMBER OF HOURS, DEFENDANT'S 
NEED AND THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE PARTIES. 
A. Evidence and testimony proffered by Defendant's 
counsel and the Findings of Fact entered by the Court 
clearly meet the requirements necessary for the Court to 
award attorney's ±&&s* 
Defendant's counsel is aware of the necessity and 
requirement of presenting evidence and testimony to the 
court in order for the court to grant an award of attorney's 
fees. In fact. Defendant's counsel referred to the TALLEY 
case when informing the court of his intended proffer. (TR 
p. 392) 
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Counsel then proffered that he has spent forty-seven 
hours on the case and that he billed attorney's fees at 
Seventy-Five Dollars ($75.00) an hour, totalling Three 
Thousand Five Hundred Forty Dollars <$3,540*00). Although 
counsel did not specifically proffer the necessity or 
reasonableness in light of circumstances achieved, the Trial 
Court asked Plaintiff's counsel if the proffer were 
acceptable to him. The Court further asked Plaintiff's 
counsel if he wanted Defendant's counsel to ". . . testify 
as to the necessity of the number of hours or whether that's 
a reasonable rate that's charged in this area . . . " (TR p. 
393). 
Plaintiff's counsel then stipulated that $75.00 an hour 
was a reasonable rate and indicated that he would accept the 
proffer, but did not agree with the total number of hours. 
<TR 393). 
In his memorandum decision, Judge Christoffersen 
granted Defendant attorney's fees in the amount of $3,000.00 
stating: 
The Court finds that in view of the difference in 
earning ability and actual income received by both 
parties, the Defendant has sufficiently 
demonstrated the financial need for attorney's 
fees. The Defendant proffered evidence of 
attorney's fees, showing the time spent and hourly 
rate charged and his position of the necessity of 
the number of hours spent and it was stipulated by 
counsel for the opposing side that the rate 
charged was a reasonable one and was commonly 
charged for divorce action in this community. 
Therefore, the Court awards Defendant attorney's 
fees based on the ne&d and results achieved in the 
case in the amount of $3,000.00. <MD p. 6 TAB 1) 
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The Court further entered specific Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law regarding attorney's fees, the time 
spent, the hourly rate charged and the number and necessity 
of hours spent in light of the difficulty of the case and 
the results achieved. <FF # 7 & 8, Conclusion #4) No 
objections to the Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law 
were ever raised by Plaintiff. 
This Court has recently stated in ASPER v. ASPER, 81 
Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), that in order to 
award attorney's fees in a divorce action, the award must be 
based on the need of the party and the reasonableness of the 
fees awarded, a matter largley left to the discretion of the 
trial court, 81 Utah Adv. Rep. at 45. (See also WALTHER v 
WALTHER, 709 P.2d 387, 388, (Utah 1985). In ASPER, this 
Court remanded the case to the trial court for a 
determination of the need of Mrs. Asper for attorney's 
fees. In the instant action, that need has already been 
clearly established and the reasonableness and necessity of 
the attorney's fees can also reasonably be determined from 
the record and the proffer made. 
This Court should also take note of the concurring 
opinion of Justice Durham in NEWMEYER v NEWMEYER, 69 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), wherein Justice Durham 
stated: 
I concur in the majority opinion except for its 
vacation ol the award of attorney's fees. The 
standard of reasonableness set forth by the 
22 
majority is entirely correct, but in view of the 
pleadings, discovery, pretrial appearances, full 
day's trial, and number and complexity of the 
issues, all of which are patent on the face of the 
record (and therefore obvious also to the trial 
judge), I think that the trial court had 
sufficient information to assess reasonableness. 
Keeping in mind that the trial itself took 
a full day and that there was a pretrial hearing 
on support and at least one deposition taken by 
Defendant's counsel, I have no difficulty taking 
judicial notice that the fee of $1,423*00 was 
reasonable. In view of Plaintiff's need, I think 
it inappropriate to deny her the assistance 
ordered by the trial court. 
The necessity of the attorneys fees in the instant 
action is reflected in the court records. There were 
pleadings and affidavits prepared to request Judge Call to 
vacate his Ex-Parte Custody Order; an initial hearing on the 
order to show cause and two days of trial; interrogatories 
prepared and responded to and considerable trial preparation 
in interviewing the numerous witnesses. There is more than 
sufficient evidence in the record and from the proffer for 
the trial court to determine necessity. In fact, the Court 
ultimately established attorney's fees in an amount less 
than proffered by counsel, indicating that Judge 
Christoffersen reviewed the matter and considered the 
relevant factors in making a decision regarding attorney's 
The Court did not abuse its descretion nor did the 
Court err in awarding attorney's fees, especially in light 
of the Defendant's need and circumstances and the eventual 
outcome of the action. 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT IS GRANTED CONSIDERABLE 
DISCRETION WHEN ESTABLISHING CHILD SUPPORT. 
A* Appellant's new job with the State Highway 
Department in addition to his farming income was considered 
by the Court as a substantial and material change of 
circumstances. 
Child support was originally established pursuant to a 
stipulated divorce decree, which was entered prior to the 
birth of the child* At the time of the trial, the child was 
four years old and Defendant's income had substantially 
increased in that Defendant was still maintaining the 
farming operations he was involved in at the time of the 
marriage and was also employed with the Utah Department of 
Transportation in addition to the farming operation. The 
Trial Court found as follows: 
The Defendant also has a Counterpetition for a 
change in child support payments because of a 
substantial change of circumstances showing that 
at the time of the divorce the income on farm 
income was based upon $800.00 to $1,000.00 per 
month income. The Petitioner now has other 
employment where he receives a gross income of 
$1,240.00 in addition to the farm income, which at 
the time of the divorce was indictaed to be 
$800.00 to $1,000.00. Although the Petitioner 
testifies that farm income has now been reduced to 
anywhere from $700.00 a month to $0 or in fact a 
natural loss. But, even so, his gross income has 
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substantially increased more than double that of 
the Defendant* Even eliminating the farm income, 
there is a substantial increase since the time of 
the divorce. The Court will, therefore, grant the 
petition for change of child support and raise the 
figure to $150.00 p&T month. (MD p. 7 TAB 1; FF # 
9,~10, & 11 TAB 2) 
B. The Uniform Child Support Guidelines are to be 
followed in temporary child support orders and even then can 
be modified by the Court However, the Court's award of child 
support still falls within the Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines, 
As indicated by Plaintiff, the Department of Social 
Services, under mandate from the Utah Legislature, has 
prepared a Uniform Child Support Schedule, However, as 
stated in UCA 78-45-7(4) the Child Support Schedule is for 
temporary support only and has no bearing on permanent 
support orders issued by the court. Furthermore, the court 
is allowed discretion in applying the child support schedule 
based upon the specific, circustances of each case. 
Even applying the child support schedule which was in 
effect at the time of the Court's decision, which is 
attached hereto as TAB 3, (which was effective as of 
September 1, 1987), based solely on Plaintiff's income from 
the Department of Transportation of $1,240.00 per month, his 
child support obligation would be $152.00 per month. This 
does not consider any income Plaintiff may derive from 
farming operations. 
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The trial court is granted considerable discretion and 
latitude in entering support orders. The Court was 
certainly avare of Plaintiff's child by his current marriage 
and may have considered in the decision. Even without 
considering a second child, there is certainly substantial 
evidence to justify the Court's decision to increase child 
support. And even then, $150.00 p&r month is a very 
moderate amount in assisting in the monetary needs of 
supporting and raising a child, especially considering 
Defendant's income ability and circumstances. 
IV. 
IN LIGHT OF THE CLEAR OUTCOME OF THE ACTION, 
THERE IS NO REASONABLE BASIS FOR PLAINTIFF'S 
APPEAL AND DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND DOUBLE COSTS. 
Pursuant to Rule 33<a) of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, nIf the court determines that a motion made or 
an appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages and single or double 
costs, including reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing 
party." Although this Court has indicated that " . . . 
sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be applied in 
egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the 
right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions." <P0RC0 v. 
P0RC0, Supra at 36) Plaintiff's appeal should be considered 
egregious since the Trial Court clearly enumerated its 
findings and the basis of its decision, making it extremely 
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unlikely that Plaintiff could reasonably be expected to 
prevail on the appeal given the standards of appellate 
review of the court's decision, and further considering 
Defendant's extremly limited income and ability to afford to 
respond to the appeal* 
In PORCO, the court defined a frivolous appeal as "one 
having no reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in 
Rule 40<A). W 79 Utah Adv. Rep* at 36. In that case, the 
court granted sanctions because of plaintiff's continual 
harrasment of the defendant through legal actions and the 
clear likelihood that he would not prevail on the appeal. 
This Court further stated: 
We recognize that sanctions for frivolous appeals 
should only be applied in the egregious cases, 
lest there be an improper chilling of the right to 
appeal erroneous lower court decisions. However, 
sanctions should be imposed when "an appeal is 
obviously without any merit and has been taken 
with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and 
results in delayed implementation of the judgment 
of the lower court; increased costs of litigation; 
and disipation of the time and resources of the 
law court. 79 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. 
This court also awarded sanctions against the town of 
Mantua in BRIGHAM CITY v* MANTUA TOWN, 83 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). In that case, this Court ruled that 
there was no legal or factual basis upon which Mantua could 
reasonably expect to prevail and likewise that there was no 
reasonable basis for Mantua's appeal to Court of Appeals. 
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In the instant action, as stated many times earlier in 
this brief, for Plaintiff to have any possibility of 
prevailing on the appeal, there must be NO evidence upon 
which the trial court could reasonably base its decision. 
That simply and clearly is not the situation in the instant 
action* 
In Judge Christoffersen's seven page Memorandum 
Decision, he distincly reviewed the testimony of all the 
witnesses, both pro and con, and also cited the law in 
referring to HOGGE and KRAMER- The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are clear and detailed* Judge 
Christoffersen obviously weighed all of the evidence and 
based his decision on the evidence before him. There can be 
absolutely no doubt that there is considerable evidence 
which supports the trial court's decision, including the 
custody modification issue, attorneys fees and child 
support. As such, Plaintiff's appeal is obviously without 
any merit and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood 
of prevailing. The appeal has further delayed the 
implementation of the lower court's Judgment, has increased 
the cost of litigation, which is especially egregious in 
this situation where Defendant is in no position to be able 
to afford defending herself in court, but has no choice in 
the matter, and is further a dissipation of the time and 
resources of this Court. 
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The Trial Court, after considering the proffers and 
evidence regarding attorneys fees, granted Defendant 
attorneys fees for initially defending herself. This Court 
should further grant Defendant attorneys fees and double 
costs for being required to respond to an appeal which is 
clearly lacking in merit* 
CONCLUSION 
It is abundantly clear from the record, the Court's 
Memorandum Decision, and the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, that the Trial Court considered and 
weighed the evidence in entering its decision. Judge 
Christoffersen found that Defendant was a fit and proper 
pBTscn to take care of the parties' son in spite of 
Plaintiff's efforts to pursuade the Court to the contrary. 
The Trial Court, in correctly applying th£ legal standards 
established by the Supreme Court of Utah, found, after 
considering all the evidence, that there had not been a 
substantial change in circumstances in Defendant's parenting 
ability OT the custodial relationship to warrant reopening 
the custody issue and denied Plaitniff's Petition for change 
of custody. The Trial Court further found, based upon the 
evidence before it, that Defendant was entitled to an award 
of attorneys fees and that Plaintiff's circumstances had 
substantially changed to warrant a modification of the child 
support award to $150.00 per month. 
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Judge Christoffersen clearly did not abuse his 
discretion in reaching the decision he did in this case and 
his decision is supported by an abundance of evidence. In 
fact, the decision of the Trial Court is sufficiently 
supported by the evidence as to make it exteremly unlikely 
that Plaintiff could prevail on this appeal and this Court 
should grant Defendant attorneys fees in this action. 
Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in showing that 
the Trial Court abused its descretion. Therefore, the 
Judgment and Order of the Trial Court should be affirmed in 
all respects vith attorneys fees and double costs to 
Defendant. 
±.V£ RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _/.,/_ day of June, 1988 
i ant/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^12- d aY 0± June, 1988, I 
mailed four copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to 
Tim W. Healey, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent at 863 25th 
Street, Ogden, Utah 84401 by depositing the same in the U. 
S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
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ADDENDUM 
TAB 1. Memorandum Decision of Trial Court dated 
November 9, 1987. 
TAB 2. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment and Order, dated November 23, 
1987. 
TAB 3. September 1987 Uniform Child Support 
Schedule. 
Reproduction of Utah Code Provisions 
dealing with the Uniform Child Support 
Schedule, UCA 78-45-7. 
TAB 4. Report of Dr. B. Mathews Hill, Dr. Ed. D. , 
Family Therapist. 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS G. MAUGHAN, 
Plaintiff 
v. 




Civil No. 21388 
This matter became before the Court on a hearing based on 
plaintiffs petition for a custody change based upon a substantial 
change in circumstances. It being the position of the petitioner, 
the defendant's lifestyle has changed substantially. It is alleqed 
that since the divorce there have been several moves made to differs 
localities by the defendant causing instability as far as the 
household arrangements are concerned. Her ability of or will to 
properly supervise the child has deteriorated , she now allows the 
child too much freedom or surrograte care, not properly attend to 
his sanitary needs by allowing unsanitary conditions to exist in 
her household, fails to properly keep the child clean, well clothes, 
and properly fed. Also another factor in the change is that 
instances of promiscuity by the defendant has had an adverse effect 
.;on the child. Also an allegation of possible sexual child abuse 
\? Xby a boyfriend of the defendant although there is not evidence 
cy] -r* • that this was within the knowledge of the defendant. There was 
^^% evidence by Sandi Krebs that the defendant's housekeeping deteriorat 
cc f 
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use of alcohol. Another lady, Anita Perry, also testified to 
poor housekeeping and the kids being dirty. Petitioner's present 
wife also testified to her observation of the mother failing to 
keep proper control of the child and felt she should spend more 
time with the child, dress him better, and keep a better house. 
Petitioner also testified he did not like the way his ex-wife was 
taking care of his child. Ex-landlord Bill Peck testified also 
that while the defendant was living at his house as a tenant she 
would stay out late, let the kids run wild and allow them to be 
destructive. 
This testimony was contradicted by the defendant stating 
under the circumstances she had few job skills, difficulty keeping 
steady employment, had insufficient income to allow her to spend 
as much time as she would like with her child and she received 
only $75.00 a month child support a month as aid from the petitionee 
Also, other witnesses testified in her behalf. Rose King, a 
social worker testified that she monitored defendant's household 
for over a period of three months, made visits that were unschedulec 
so as the defendant would not know when she would be there, always 
found the house clean, the children taken care of, and saw no 
basis for finding the motherfs care inappropriate. Also, a Mrs. 
Northrup whose daughter was a baby sitter for six months had ample 
opportunity to observe the child in question and also other childrei 
of the defendant and her observations felt she kept a good home and 
her parenting skills were not inappropriate. Nancy Hunt, a baby 
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sitter, also observed the children in the household of the 
defendant and felt that it was well cared for, the children were 
clean and well cared for, and showed great affection for the 
children and no inappropriate parental care. 
Becky Valcarce, therapist for ISAT testified that she felt 
that there was evidence of sexual abuse to Riley by the defendant's 
boyfriend, Jack Alley, but no evidence that the defendant knew abou 
it. Sandy Robbinette, a clinical director of The Child and Family 
Support Center, stated she found no evidence of a distrubed child 
or one who had been sexually abused and found a positive relationsh 
as a parent. Roberta Hardy, also a social services worker, testifi* 
as to discrepancies in the procedures used by Becky Valcarce in 
making her determination and found that the children were positive 
with their mother and the mother had done nothing wrong in the 
raising of her child. Obviously there was a great deal of conflict 
in the testimony regarding the defendant's supervision, child care, 
housekeeping, promiscuity and sexual abuse. A witness called by 
the petitioner, who was their former bishop, testified that after 
the divorce he counseled with the defendant, one of her difficulties 
was her husband the petitioner, that she was in dire financial strai 
with her children and emotionally upset immediately after the 
divorce because of her financial picture as a result of the divorce 
itself. 
The Court does not feel that those changes that occur in a 
divorce are grounds to show a substantial change in circumstances 
t,u-. C69 ••& 11 7 ' 
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that would merit or should be even considered in determining the 
requisite substantial change in circumstances for a change of custO( 
Divorce causes a change in circumstances by the very nature of the 
result of such a proceeding. Mathew Hill, a therapist, testified 
that his major concern was the stability of the child, Riley, by mo1 
in residential changes by the defendant and an irregular visitation 
schedule, and he felt that the child's stability could be imporved 
by a regular visitation schedule, he also felt both parties had 
parenting skills that are appropriate and not out of line, there is 
a bonding to each of the parents. He did have some concern over 
changes in father-type figures by reason of the defendant having 
had different boyfriends. 
The Court feels that the evidence does not support the defendaj 
being a bad mother by improper child care, cleanliness, supervision 
or the lack thereof, that she is a good mother with appropriate 
child caring skills now as she was when she was married. There was 
probably a period of time right after the divorce, because of the 
effects of the divorce and a nine month period in Salt Lake after 
the divorce, where there was conduct that certainly could be 
labeled as promiscuous. But, there is no indication this had 
an impact that affected her children and it also appears that 
she has since stabilized from this position. She is apparently 
employed by doing piece work for ALCO, Inc., although this does 
require long hours and her income is only $650.00 a month. She is 
doing everything she can to work and support herself and her childr 
^ 063 =;.: 12 ? 
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The evidence also indicates that when she feels there may 
be a problem with her children, such as the allegations of sexual 
abuse by one of her boyfriends against Riley, she immediately took 
what steps she could to insure his safety and welfare and immediate, 
consulted professionals for aid. 
A single parent who has to take what employment they can get 
certainly has more difficulty as opposed to dual parents. The 
single parent has to arrange schedules, child care, perform all 
the household tasks, that are necessary. The Court does not feel tt 
the defendant should be penalized because of this kind of a situatic 
where she does not have the same financial abilities as the petitior 
in order to provide a stable environment. The fact that the 
petitioner is remarried making this a dual parent household is not 
such a substantial change of circumstances that would merit a change 
of custody or simply any remarriage would have the ping-pong effect 
on child custody. 
The Court, therefore, feels the peitioner has not met the 
first prong of the test as stated under Hogg v. Hogg, 649 P.2nd 51. 
The Court feels the facts do not show defendants present position 
substantially affects the custodial parent's parenting ability or 
the functioning of the custodial relationship which justify re-
opening the custody question. In Kramer v. Karmer, 57 UAR Page 14, 
petitioner there also sought a change of custody based on his 
wife's circumstances wherein he alleged that his ex-wife's new 
husband beat her, that she was alcoholic, that she suffers from a 
ti •• 0 6 9 -.:-. 1 3 ' 
Maughan v. Maughan 
Civil 31288 
Page Six 
narcissistic personality and created animosity between Jason and 
the appellant and refused to obtain treatment for the child and 
that the child was unwashed and unkept. The Court refused to 
acknowledge such conditions to be a substantial change of 
circumstances and refused to change custody. 
There are facts and circumstances about the defendant's living 
position and lifestyle that are not the best for the child, but it 
cannot be said her actions and conduct and situation constitutes a 
substantial change of circumstances. The conduct, whatever it may b 
of the defendant, must be shown to have a substantial adverse impact 
upon the child, showing a material change of circumstances. That 
impact has not been shown even if her conduct has had defects and 
she bore an illegitimate child. Petitioner's request to have the 
custody change is denied. 
The Court finds that in view of the difference in earning 
ability and actual income received by both parties, the defendant 
has sufficiently demonstrated the financial need for attorney's 
fees. The defendant proffered evidence of attorney's fees, showinc 
time spent and the hourly rate charged and his position of the 
necessity of the number of hours spent and it was stipulated by 
counsel for the opposing side that the rate charged was a reasonable 
one and was commonly charged for divorce action in this community. 
Therefore, the Court awards the defendant attorney's fees based on 
the need and result achieved in the case in the amount of $3,000.0( 
kv 0 6 9 .ACE 14 
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The defendant also had a counterpetition for a change in 
child support payments because of a substantial change of 
circumstances showing that at the time of the divorce the income 
on farm income was based upon $800.00 to $1,000.00 per month income, 
The petitioner now has other employment where he received a gross 
income of $1,240.00 in addition to the farm income which at the 
time of the divorce was indicated to be $800.00 to $1,000.00. 
Although the petitioner testifies that farm income has now been 
reduced to anywhere from $700.00 a month to zero or in fact an 
actual loss. But, even so, his gross income has substantially incre 
more than double that of the defendant. Even eliminating the farm 
income, there is a substantial increase since the time of the 
divorce. The Court will, therefore, grant the petition for change 
of child support and raise the figure to $150.00 a month. Counsel 
for defendant to prepare the appropriate findings and order. 
Dated this Q day of November, 19 87. 
BY TliE COJ 
COW OF THE ABOVE MAILED TO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS G. MAUGHAN, * 
Plaintiff * FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
v. * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
PAULETTE LADAWN NORMAN MAUGHAN * 
Defendant. * CIVIL NO. 21388 
This matter came on for hearing before the Court, the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, sitting without a jury, on 
October 16, 1987 and again on November 5, 1987. Plaintiff was 
present and represented by counsel, Tim W. Healy. Defendant 
was present and represented by counsel, Stephen W. Jewell. 
The Court having heard the evidence and testimony presented 
and the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the 
premises, now finds and concludes as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1, Although there was testimony from Plaintiff's 
witnesses to the effect that Defendant did not properly care 
and supervise the child, failed to properly keep the child eep tne cniia \^ ~/ 
mberc9 \3ln ^ 
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clean, well clothed and properly fed, that Defendant indulged 
in the use of alcohol, was sexually promiscuous and may have 
allowed the child to be sexually abused, the Court finds that, 
based on contradicting testimony, the Defendant properly 
maintained her home and took care of the child, that 
Defendant's care for the child and her .parenting skills are 
not inappropriate, that the child was clean and well cared for 
and that Defendant shows great affection for the child. 
2» Although there was evidence of potential sexual abuse 
to the child by the Defendant's boyfriend. Jack Alley, the 
Court finds there was no evidence that Defendant knew about 
any such sexual abuse, if any, and that Defendant immediately 
took what steps she could to ensure the child's safety and 
welfare and immediately consulted professionals for aid. 
3. The Court further finds that although there may have 
been some changes in Defendant's life since the divorce, the 
Court does not feel that those changes that occur in a divorce 
are grounds to show a substantial change in circumstances that 
would merit or should even be considered in determining the 
requisite substantial change in circumstances for a change in 
custody. Divorce causes a change in circumstances by the very 
nature of the results of such a proceeding. Although there 
was probably a period of time right after the divorce, because 
of the effects of the divorce, and a nine month period in Salt 
Lake after the divorce where there was conduct that could be 
labeled as promiscuous, there is no indication that this 
conduct had an impact on or affected the child. It als,o 
2 
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appears that Defendant has since stabilized from this 
position, that she is currently employed and that she is doing 
everything she can to work and support herself and her 
children. 
4. The Court finds that a single parent who has to take 
what employment he or she can find certainly has more 
difficulty as opposed to dual parents. The single parent has 
to arrange schedules, child care, and perform all of the 
household tasks that are necessary. The Court does not feel 
that the Defendant should be penalized because of this kind of 
a situation nor because she does not have the same financial 
ability as the Petitioner in order to provide a stable 
environment. 
5» The fact that Plaintiff is remarried making his a 
dual-parent household is not such a substantial change of 
circumstances that would merit a change of custody or simply 
any remarriage would have ping-pong effect on child custody. 
6. There are facts and circumstances about the 
Defendant's living position and lifestyle that are not the 
best for the child, but the Court cannot find that her 
actions, conduct and situation constitute a substantial change 
of circumstances. The conduct, whatever it may be of the 
Defendant, must be shown to have a substantial adverse impact 
upon the child, showing a material change of circumstances. 
That impact has not been shown even if her conduct has had 
defects and she bore an illegitimate child. 
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7. The Court finds that in view of the difference in 
earning ability and actual income received by both parties, 
the Defendant has sufficiently demonstrated a financial need 
for attorney's ±&&s* 
8. The Court finds that Defendant proffered evidence of 
attorney's fees, showing time spent, the hourly rate charged, 
and the necessity of the number of hours spent in light of the 
difficulty of the case. It was stipulated by counsel for the 
Plaintiff that the rate charged was a reasonable one and was 
commonly charged for a divorce action in this community. The 
Court finds that Defendant should be awarded attorney's fees 
based on the need and results achieved in the case in the 
amount of $3,000.00. 
9. The Court finds that Plaintiff's income has increased 
substantially from approximately $800.00 to $1,000.00 per 
month solely from farm income at the time of the divorce to a 
gross income from Plaintiff's employment with the Utah 
Department of Transportati on of $1,2-40. 00 in addition to farm 
income. 
10. Even vithhout farm income, the Court finds that 
Plaintiff's income has substantially increased and has more 
than doubled that of the Defendant. 
11. Plaintiff's increased income constitutes a 
substantial change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a 
modification of the Decree to increase child support and to 
raise the child support figure to $150.00 per month. 
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12. The Court incorporates herein by reference such 
other facts as are stated in the Memorandum Decision dated 
November 9, 1987. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff has not met the first prong test as stated 
under HOGGE v. HOGGE, 694 P.2d 51. 
2. There has not been a substantial nor material change 
in circumstances of the custodial parent's parenting ability 
or the functioning of the custodial relationship which would 
justify reopening the custody questions. Although there are 
facts and circumstances about the Defendant's living position 
and lifestyle that are not the best for the child, the Court 
concludes that it cannot be said that her actions, conduct and 
situation constitute a substantial change in circumstances. 
The Court concludes that such conduct, whatever it may be of 
the Defendant, does not show a material change of 
circumstances. The Court further concludes that those changes 
that occur as the result of a divorce are not grounds to show 
a substantial change in circumstances that would merit, or 
should even be considered in determining the requisite 
substantial change in circumstance for change in custody. 
Divorce causes a change in circumstnces by the very nature of 
the result of such a proceeding. 
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3. Plaintiff's request to have custody of Riley Maughan 
should be denied* 
4. In view of the difference in earning ability and 
actual income received by both parties, Defendant has 
sufficiently demonstrated the financial need for attorney's 
fees. The Court concludes that $3,000.00 is a reasonable 
amount of attorney's fees, that the number of hours spent were 
necessary in light of the difficulty of the case, that the 
rate charged was reasonable as stipulated by opposing counsel 
and was commonly charged for divorce actions in the community, 
and that the award for attorney's fees is based on the need 
and results acheived in the case. 
5. Due to Plaintiff's increase in income, there has been 
a substantial and material change in circumstances sufficient 
to warrant a modification of the Divorce Decree to increase 
child support for the minor child to $150.00 per month. 
6. The Court incorporates herein by reference such other 
conclusions of law as are stated in the Memorandum Decision 
dated November 9, 1987. 
MLS c^ -J DATED th: day of November, 1987. 
BY THE C0UR 
VeNoy C h ' r y s t c ^ e r s e n 
D i s t r i c t /Fudge 
* ceg««2i2 i 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
AND 
NOTICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Tim 
W. Healy, Attorney at law, 863-25th Street, Ogden, Utah 
84401, by depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid. Counsel for Defendant is hereby notified that 
pursuant to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice, counsel has 
five (5) days to submit any objections to the Court. 
DATED this /'^^day of November, 1987. 
^t^L 
W. J e w e l l 
py)X Q89f\',GE2rj 
Stephen W. Jewell 3814 W NOV \% p^ 
Attorney for Defendant CfiCHF r- ' ^ 
First Security Bldg., Third Floor '^^^C'PfL-
15 South Main ^th/x 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-2000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS G. MAUGHAN, * 
Plaintiff • JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
v. * 
PAULETTE LADAWN NORMAN MAUGHAN * 
Defendant. * CIVIL NO. 21388 
This matter came on for hearing before the Court, the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, sitting without a jury, on 
October 16, 1987 and again on November 5, 1987. Plaintiff was 
present and represented by counsel, Tim W. Healy Defendant 
was present and represented by counsel, Stephen W. Jewell. 
The Court having heard the evidence and testimony presented 
and the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the 
premises, and having previously entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, now enters the following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Petition for Modification of Divorce 
is hereby denied and custody of the minor child of the 
parties, to wit: Riley Maughan, shall remain with 
Defendant. Number - ^ 3 7y^^:^ 
NOV 2 31987 
2. Defendant is awarded Judgment against Plaintiff 
as and for attorney's fees in the amount of $3,000.00. 
3. The Decree of Divorce shall be and is hereby 
modified to increase child support paid by Plaintiff to 
Defendant to $150.00 per month commencing November 1, 
1987. Said child support shall be paid one half on the 
5th and one half on the 20th of each month. Plaintiff's 
income may be withheld pursuant to UCA 78-45d-l, et. 
seq., if Plaintiff becomes delinquent in payment of child 
support obligations. 
4. All of the provisions of the Decree entered 
previously in this action shall remain as stated. 
DATED th is 3 5' day of November, 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
VeNoy^ Chyisxof o^ersen 
Districtt/Judgej 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
AND 
NOTICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER to Tim W. Healy, Attorney at 
law, 863-25th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401, by depositing the 
same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. Counsel for Defendant 
is hereby notified that pursuant to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of 
Practice, counsel has five <5) days to submit any objections 
to the Court. ^ 
DATED this / /^-day of November, 1987. 
W. J e w e l l 
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Determination of amount of support - Assessment 
formula for temproary support. 
) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount 
granted by prior court order unless there has been a 
material change of circumstance on the part of the 
obligor or obligee. 
) When no prior court order exists, or a material 
change in circumstances has occurred, the court in 
determining the amount of prospective support, shall 
consider all relevant factors including but not 
limited to: 
<a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
id) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the n&ed of the obligee; 
<f) the age of the parties; 
<g) the responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of others* 
) When no prior court order exists, the court shall 
determine and assess all arrearages based upon, but 
not limited to: 
(a) the amount of public assistance received by 
the obligee, if any; 
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and 
necessarily expended in support of sppouse 
and children. 
) In determining the amount of prospective support on 
an ex parte or other motion for temporary support, 
the court shall use a uniform statewide assessment 
formula, adjusted for regional differences, prior to 
rendering the support order. The formula shall 
provide for all relevant factors which can be readily 
identified and shall allow for reasonable deductions 
from the obligor's earnings for taxes, work related 
expenses, and living expenses* The assessment 
formula shall be established by the Department of 
Social Services and periodically reviewed by the 
Judicial Council under Subsection 3-21(3). 
©„ M t o a mna id J . 
Assessment & Psychotherapy 
3670 Quincy Avenue Suite 101 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
(801)782-9391 
Mental & Emotional Assessment 
Subject: Riley Maughan & Family 
Report Date. October 13, 1987 
Dates of Assessment: October 3, 4, 8, & 12, 1987 
Assessment Purpose: This assessment was performed in response to a 
reauest made by Attorney Tim W. Healy, pursuant to an earlier order of the 
court in this matter. Specifically what was requested was an assessment 
of the mental and emotional factors involved in assisting the court to make 
a determination of this child's best interests in terms of custodial 
placement. 
Family members completed the following assessment measures- Riley: 
Peaboay Picture Vocabulary Test, Children's Apperception Test, Vineland 
Social Maturity Scale, Draw-A-Person Test, and clinical interviews; 
Paulette, Jannette, and Thomas Maughan: Becker Adjective Checklist, 
Checklist "C'-Taplin Version, Children's Problem Checklist, Likes and 
Dislikes Form, and the Personality Inventory for Children used as a measure 
of parental perception only. Each adult also completed a clinical interview. 
Thomas and Jannette Maughan also completed the Locke-Wallace Marital 
Adjustment Test. 
Prior to or concurrent with the family assessment, the following documents 
were reviewed and collateral contacts made: The petition of the plaintiff 
and the response of the defendant were reviewed. A collateral contact was 
made with Becky Valcarce, M.S. of the ISAT office in Logan. During that 
contact I reviewed a videotape of the subject made on July 2,1987. 
History. Interview Data and Mental Status of Family Members 
Maughan; 
Identifying Information Mr. Maughan was born January 15, 1987. He is 
currently 28 years old He was raised in Wellsville, Utah, the youngest of 
nine children His father was an educator and his mother was briefly 
employed outside the home at a cheese factory He spent a great deal of 
time doing farm work as he grew up. He continues to be involved with dairy 
farming He graduated from Skyview High School as an average student and 
briefly attended U.S.U. and Dixie College^ 
Occupational History Mr. Maughan reports long-standing involvement in 
farming beginning around his ninth grade year, with a hiatus during the time 
he served an LD.S. mission. He resumed farming after his mission and 
occasionally worked at custom hay hauling, ditch digging and for another 
person's dairy before becoming associated with the current dairy enterprise. 
He reports having worked one season for Parsons. He has been employed 
full-time by the Utah Department of Transportation since May of 1984 He 
reports approximate earnings of $15,000.00 from the Utah Department of 
Transportation and $1,300 from the dairy annually. He receives a good 
fringe package from his state employment. 
Marital History- Tom married Paulette in July, 1982 They were divorced 
later that year. Paulette was pregnant with Riley at the time of the 
divorce, and he was born after the divorce was in effect. Paulette had been 
granted custody in the original decree, with Tom being given reasonable 
visitation rights Tom met Jannette around the time of the divorce. Their 
courtship lasted approximately a year and a half and they were married in 
July of 1985 A son, Cliff, was born to this union. 
Medical and Mental Health History: Tom's medical history is unremarkable 
with the exception of minor trauma requiring stitches. His mental health 
history includes counseling with Lynn Yaggi subsequent to a conviction of 
driving under the influence in 1982. He reports a positive termination from 
the counseling process. Tom has not had any subsequent DUI convictions. He 
notes that he would engage in occasional social drinking with male friends 
on weekends, but reports having abstained from drinking for several weeks 
He admits that during his marriage to Paulette he experimented with 
marijuana He reports a frequency of consumption of one to two times a 
month during that period. 
Paulette Norman Maughan-
Identifying Information: Paulette was born May 12, 1961, the second of 
three girls m h^r family of origin She is 26 years of age. She notes that 
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she was separated in age from each of her sisters. She grew up, for the 
most part, in Brigham City. She moved to Cache Valley in her later teenage 
years as a result of her parents separating. Her parents later divorce and 
her mother remarried. Her father was a construction worker and artist and 
her mother provided home day care and did sewing for hire. Due to her 
family's moves, Paulette attended high school in Box Elder County, Logan 
City and at Skyview. She left school for employment but received her 6ED 
soon after discontinuing school. She attended one semester at Rick's 
College in Idaho and also took training as a nurse's aide and as a secretary. 
Occupational History: While in high school, Paulette was a waitress in the 
Country Kitchen. She worked as a nurse's aide immediately upon 
discontinuing high school. She then attended Rick's, where she was not 
employed. She also choose not to be employed while married to her first 
husband, Dennis. She next worked for Bourn's (Boren's?). She reports that 
her son Cody became sick at that time and she was also laid off. Her next 
position was with the E.A. Miller Company. She reports not being employed 
while she was married to Tom. After divorcing Tom she moved to Ogden and 
was employed by Levelor Lorenz, Inc. She reports that she then became 
pregnant with Josh and was laid off. She then returned to Brigham City and 
took training for a secretarial position. After completing the training she 
worked part time for the Bank of Utah. She then sought full time 
employment in Salt Lake City, and found work with the Littlef ield Company. 
She reports a dispute with her employer which resulted in her resigning. 
She also noted that Joshua was requiring treatment for problems at that 
time. She is currently employed doing piece work for Alco, Inc. She reports 
an income of $650 a month, if she is able to work all of her possible hours 
and if her piece rate is high. She also receives $75.00 child support from 
Tom. She has not been receiving the child support that was granted in her 
divorce settlement from the f irst marriage. 
Marital History; Paulette was originally married to Dennis Kranendonk. 
They had lived together briefly and then were married. They had always 
fought and after the marriage his assaultive behavior increased. He became 
very difficult to live with after the birth of their son, Cody. After he 
physically abused the child, she left him. She recently placed a protective 
order against him since he would come to the current residence and again 
become abusive in from of the children. She notes that they were together 
for eight months and officially divorced after one year. 
She reports meeting Tom in January of 1982. They dated for awhile and 
were married in July of that year. She reports that she was pregnant at the 
time but subsequently miscarried the child. She noted the onset of several 
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problems when she lost the baby. She reported that at that time Tom 
doubted she had ever been pregnant, and had used the pregnancy as a ploy to 
get him to marry her. She notes they both began to drink and use marijuana 
at that time and went their separate ways. They were divorced late in the 
autumn of the same year. Riley was conceived during the latter part of their 
relationship. Paulette did not remarry after this divorce. She has had one 
child since the divorce, namely Joshua. Paulette claims that Tom is the 
father of the child and this action is also before the court since Tom denies 
paternity. Paulette is currently pregnant with a child she claims was 
fathered by Jack Alley, her former fiance. She is considering giving the 
child up for adoption, since she feels she is not ready to handle the~ 
additional responsibility of another child and feels that the child might do 
better in an adoptive home. 
Medical and Mental Health History: Paulette had one kidney removed as a 
teenager. She has been on medications to deal with the resulting deficiency 
since that time. She has also had a partial hearing loss for several years. 
She is currently taking Macrodanton to prevent kidney infections and 
prenatal vitamins. She acknowledges her marijuana use during her marriage 
to Tom. She also admits to social drinking. While admitting to getting 
drunk in the past, she denies that she drinks just to get drunk. She usually 
consumes wine cooler and/or beer. She denies keeping alcoholic beverages 
in the house. She does admit to some heavy drinking while she was going 
with Jack Alley, but she contends she became troubled by his excess 
drinking and this, in large measure, is what convinced her to break off the 
engagement. She reports being seen by a mental health professional at the 
time of marital discord with her first husband. The provider was a U.S.U. 
graduate student. She did not report any further involvement with a mental 
health professional beyond this encounter. 
Jannette Maugharv. 
Identifying Information: Jannette was born January 21, 1964 and is 23 
years old. She is the fourth of five children. Her father was employed by 
Utah & Idaho Sugar Company until he took over management of the Perry 
Lodge in Kanab. They are now managers of an R.V. park in Kanab. Jannette 
reports that she was active in sporting and extra-curricular activities all 
during her high school years and graduated from Kanab High School in 1982. 
She reports being employed in the family businesses from her teen age years 
on an intermittent basis. She also briefly attended U.S.U. and S.U.S.C. She 
has worked at a cheese plant and has worked with a graphic sign maker. She 
is not currently employed outside the home although she will occasionally 
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assist with the dairy work. This is her first marriage. One child, Cliff, has 
been born as a result of this union. 
Riley Maughan: 
Identifying information: Riley is the subject of this assessment and the 
current court hearing. He was born July 23, 1983, several months after his 
parents divorce. In the original divorce action custody of Riley was vested 
in the mother and reasonable visitation was granted to the father. In 
reality, Riley has experienced a number of custody arrangements. His visits 
at one point increased from every other weekend to periods of several 
weeks at a time when, according to Paulette, she was depressed regarding 
her employment outlook in Salt Lake City and allowed Tom and his wife 
physical custody for several weeks at a time. Thus Riley has experienced 
significant amounts of time in either home. 
Mental Status Assessments: Nothing in any interview of the four principals 
of this action suggests the presence of a marked departure from reality or 
mental impairment classically associated with the common meaning of the 
term mental illness. 
Assessment. Results and Discussion: 
Cognitive Factors: Riley's performance on the PPVT placed him in the 80th 
percentile in terms of his cognitive potential. That is to say that he 
performed at the mental age of an average child of five years and one month. 
He earned an intelligence quotient of 112. This would place him in a high 
average range of intellectual ability. There were not any indications at this 
point of gross cognitive impairment. However, neither readiness functions 
or learning disabilities were specifically addressed during this assessment. 
Coordination and related functions appeared to be intact. 
Social Factors: Assessment of Riley's social functioning would indicate 
that he is functioning with social skills possessed by the average child 
around six years of age. The functioning being addressed her concerns self-
help skills as well as communication, socialization and self-direction. 
There was some tendencies toward aggression noted, as well as a low 
frustration tolerance. There is also some indication of a very social social 
attention span. 
Emotional Factors: Riley has a tendency to give up on tasks easily. He is 
quick to discern areas where he perceives he lacks skills. He is sometimes 
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round to feign inadequacy tn order to avoid tasks using such phrases as, "I 
just don't know how." When taken in conjunction with his intellectual 
abilities, it becomes apparent that Riley does know how to accomplish 
several tasks, but chooses not to do so. Riley sees himself as unable to 
master the environment which surrounds him and fears defeat at its hands. 
His aggression can therefore be seen as a compensatory attempt to take 
charge of himself. 
This is not to say that Riley does not have strengths. He has the ability to 
relate well to peers and adults. He sees cause and effect relationships 
quite clearly and has an understanding of concepts that is advanced for his 
age. He also has verbal skills sufficient to communicate his wants, needs 
and feelings. He can engineer creative solutions to problems when they 
Interest him, and can generate solutions which go beyond the parameters set 
for him by others. He can employ active fantasy but also is able to 
distinguish truth from falsehood. 
Family Factors: 
Family factors which mental health professionals are generally asked to 
evaluate relate to the dimensions noted in Hutchison v. Hutchison (Utah, 649 
P.2d 38). These are discussed below. 
Preference for keeping siblings together: This does not have much 
application for Riley. He has lived with and bonded to siblings in both 
residences. Sibling subsystems in each household are part of his active 
experience. 
Relative strength of the child's bond to each prosoective custodian: This is 
somewhat difficult to determine in Riley's case. There is definite bonding 
with the father, the mother and the stepmother, in all of the interviews 
where he discussed his family or his parents, he would first and sometimes 
solely mention Mr. Maughan and his wife. I do not ask children of this age to 
state a parental preference. 
General interest in maintaining current custody arrangements: As noted 
above, there have been a variety of combinations of custody and visitation. 
In essence, there is no status quo. However, I feel that is in Riley's best 
interest to make a final determination on this matter be fore he enters the 
school system and suffers academically due to an unresolved custody issue. 
The presumption of the benefit of the status quo also assumes that the child 
Is happy and well adjusted In his current status. This cannot be said of 
Riley's current situation. As noted, he is beginning to display adjustment 
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problems and hts compensatory behaviors show a lack of achievable 
happiness 
Moral crnncter and emotional stability of prospective custodians None of 
the prospective custodians displayed any sign of severe mental disorder 
Tom and Paulette have both have admitted to occasional drinking and past 
experimentation with marijuana The father and stepmother have promoted 
moral character through a set of principles derived from their religious 
affiliation Questions have been raised about the moral development 
possible in the mothers home This examiner does have concerns in this 
area as well The changing of male parent figures in the home is confusing 
to a young ch'ld The possible abuse at the hands of a father figure certainly 
can add to the level of confusion A young child also has difficulty 
differentiating between a father and a person who Is just living at home or 
sieepmq with a parent Frequent moves may or may not be a sign or parental 
emotional stability, but they generally have a negative impact on children, 
esoecially as they reach tne age ut school attendance 
Duration and deoth of desire for custody Paulette has maintained that she 
has always wanted Riley, but was willing to negotiate some kind of joint 
custody arrangement Torn and Jannette have made attempts or request for 
custody since soon after they were married 
Significant impairment of a prospective custodian As noted there are not 
any apparent gross mental impairments observable in any of the prospective 
custodians I do have concerns that their may be some occupational 
maladjustment on the part of Paulette as evidenced by her frequent job 
shifts and failure to pursue any given line of work for an extended period of 
time 
Personal versus surrogate care Both Paulette and Tom are employed 
outside of the home Paulette provides day care through licensed home day 
care providers She provides care in the evenings when she goes out by 
teenage youth in the area and occasionally with her mother Tom provides 
care for the children by Jannette, since she seldom works outside of the 
home When they go out as a couple, relatives generally serve as day care 
providers There are some marked emotional advantages to having a 
parental figure provide day care This does not preclude a positive 
experience with licensed day care, although the stability and longevity is 
usually less 
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Financial considerations: The father is clearly In a superior position in 
terms of current salary and earning potential, as well as having a smaller 
family. 
Conclusions: 
While the weighbgiven to each of the above items is at the discretion of the 
court, there does appear to be significant evidence to this examiner that the 
home of the father may be able to provide a more stable environment for 
Riley at this time. Looking after the best interests of the child does not 
always involve deciding between good and bad, but may also look at good 
versus better. I look forward to being able to further clarify my findings 
during the hearing on the sixteenth. 
Sincerely yours, 
B.Mathews Hill, Ed.D. 
Licensed Family Therapist & Supervisor 
Clinical Member A.A.M.F.T. 
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